This post is continued from last July, when rumors or Kim Jong-il having heart surgery had (again) brought up the question of who would lead North Korea should he die. That post basically covered dynastic succession and focused on his three legitimate sons, Kim Jong-nam (김정남), Kim Jong-chol (김정철), and Kim Jong-eun (김정운), none of which had a clear advantage. A year later there is no new information to help discern that.

There are basically three other general possibilities should Kim Jong-il die and dynastic succession not occur; 1) group or collective leadership; 2) a senior government official could take charge, or; 3) an outside power could move in to restore order and take control.

Because there is a complete absence of an opposition party or group in-or-outside North Korea, that option is extremely unlikely and so is not considered here.

Group or Collective Leadership

Group or collective leadership by a political or military institution, or some combination thereof is perhaps the most likely scenario. The Korea Workers Party (KWP), National Defense Commission (NDC), or some sort of joint committee formed from both of those organizations and perhaps others, could fill the leadership void after Kim’s death.

I consider this most likely since these leaders a) have a vested interest in maintain the status quo and b) currently understand and run the machinery of the DPRK government, such as it is. It’s also possible such a group would use of Kim Jong-il’s sons as a figure head for legitimacy.

A New Leader

A senior official from a political or military institution could assume control after Kim’s death, perhaps taking the title of Kim’s current position as Chairman of the NDC. Examples include Kim Yong-nam (김영남), the de facto head of state since 1998 (per the DPRK constitution) or Chang Sŏng’taek (장성택), brother-in-law of Kim Jong-il and former KWP official. A general officer could also attempt to assume control.

This is slightly less likely that collective leadership as Kim Jong-il, as far as we know, currently does not allow any one person to accumulate much influence.

Foreign Intervention

Finally, there is the possibility that North Korea elites will be unable to form a cohesive government and that no one person emerges as a leader after Kim Jong-il’s death. The likely result would be chaos and intervention from either the UN command (i.e., the U.S. and South Korea), or China, depending on the specific circumstances at the time and events beforehand.

If it became apparent North Korea was drifting into chaos, it could trigger the U.S. to execute CONPLAN 5029 to secure weapons of mass destruction, perhaps including nuclear weapons, and attempt to restore a semblance of order. Depending on how such a move is carried out, the state of North Korea’s military at that time, and myriad other factors, such an action could go smoothly or trigger fighting with elements of North Korea’s million-plus-man army.

North Korea’s military leadership could also initiate hostilities, which might leader the U.S. and South Korea to execute OPLAN 5027 - basically a second Korean War.

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) would not survive a confrontation with U.S. and ROK forces, but could inflict severe casualties or those forces as well as civilian populations. The ultimate outcome would be reunification under South Korea’s system, which has it’s own set of pit-falls.

If the U.S. is still occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan, and depending in how events unfold, China’s military could be in a better position to occupy North Korea first, restoring order and keeping a buffer zone between its territory and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). This could lead to conflict between China and South Korea, and could draw in the U.S.

Conclusion

The bottom line is that no one knows who the next North Korean leader will be, perhaps or even likely including North Korean leadership. I lead towards group or collective leadership as I see the elite doing whatever they can to retain power.

Such a group may fail, bringing about collapse, war, or both. Or they could take the opportunity to retain control while, finally, adopting drastic reforms without the need to maintain the ridiculous Kim family cult.

We probably don’t have that many years to wait until Kim Jong-il dies. . .

Mike Chinoy, formerly CNN’s senior Asia correspondent, has a new book, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, which attempts to tell the story of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and America’s attempts to stop their program. Chinoy is currently a visiting professor at the Annenberg School of Journalism at the University of Southern California.

I have not purchased his book and do not plan to after listening to his interview on NPR’s “Fresh Air” yesterday. It was the author’s chance to sell me his book, complete with plenty of softballs from the NPR interviewer, but his omission of key details contrary to his point of view (or attempts to unconvincingly speak around them) ensured there will be no sale here.

An argument Chinoy consistently made was that North Korea has nearly always been ready to talk and negotiate, but not so the U.S., perhaps giving those that don’t know better the impression that North Korea is almost amiable and willing to negotiate, if only the U.S. would come to the table. If that were true, and it is not, it assumes that talking could actually achieve something worthwhile, which history has so far shown false.

Chinoy noted that the 1994 Agreed Framework, the product of “talking,” froze plutonium reprocessing successfully; but he failed to mention, at least on the radio, that North Korea started it’s HEU program just a couple of years later, under Clinton (i.e., an administration that dealt with North Korea). Oh he noted the program, or the “acquisition” of “parts” for a program, but could never admit the extreme likelihood of the existence of the program, or mention the fact that it occurred despite all the “talking” that went on.

He also suggested North Korea didn’t admit to the program in October 2002. Tong Kim was there, heard what the North Koreans said in both Korean and English, and disagrees.

As Joshua notes (in a comment at the Marmot’s), the HEU found on the documents was completely skipped over, at least for the portions of the radio interview I heard as I was away from the radio for a few minutes. It seems unlikely it was addressed in a thorough manner since it tends to contradict the other points he was trying to make.

Chinoy also faulted the Bush administration for sometimes acting as if talking to North Korea was to give up something in and of itself. Talking, no. But this also conveniently omits the North Korean pattern of having conditions for talks, which often does mean that getting to the point of talking includes giving up something.

Apparently this interview was part of NPR’s crusade against Bush, Republicans, and conservatives, which has so far every day this week presented blatantly biased interviews, with plenty of softballs and nary a critical word for the interviewees. NPR’s uncritical interviewing is ridiculous.

Like so many other areas with North Korea where conventional wisdoms do not necessarily apply (e.g., any other country likely would have collapsed by now, certainly Western ones), it’s not a given that talking to your enemy is better than not talking to them.

The Sejong Society will host a talk by Kim Dong-su, a North Korean defector who was the Second Secretary of the Permanent Representative of North Korea to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization when he defected to South Korea in 1998. Before his defection, he served in key posts in North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including as Assistant Secretary of the DPRK to Switzerland and Norway, and as the senior official of the UN Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow at South Korea’s Institute of National Security Strategy.

When & Where:

Thursday, August 14, 2008, 6:45 - 8:00 pm

Rome Auditorium
Rome Building, Johns Hopkins SAIS
1619 Massachussetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
(Closest Metro: Dupont Circle)

Be sure to RSVP for the event. Hat-tip to Maj K.

This week I had the humbling (and somewhat mind-numbing) experience of taking the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) for Korean. I’d planned on taking the test later this year as I’ll be in Korea this fall for three weeks to visit family, but circumstances dictated that the test occur sooner; I had to cram and was unprepared.

In the process of trying to get prepared, I found some excellent Korean language study resources, if you’re taking the DLPT or not.

First it dlpt.net, which offers vocabulary quizzes in Korean, English, and even hanja (한자, Korea’s use of Chinese characters). At the end of each quiz you are given your score (percentage) and a list of each word missed with both Korean and English test – very useful.

Korean Listening Practice has 85 Korean audio clips and questions for each clip. This is very similar to the DLPT listening portion of the test. While the clips are somewhat dated, they are still extremely useful.

Finally, the Flash Card Exchange offers flash cards and vocabulary lists for many languages. I suggest creating a free account, searching for “Korean” or “DLPT,” and viewing the flashcards or the many vocabulary lists created by other users, or even uploading your own vocabulary lists.

If you know of any other Korean language study resources, please list them in comments.

This week Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama criticized the Bush administration for not engaging in diplomacy with North Korea between 2002-2005. Said Obama:

“While the United States was refusing to talk with North Korea, the reclusive regime developed eight units of nuclear weapons… North Korea secured nuclear materials (plutonium) that can make eight to 10 nuclear weapons”

While I’ll be the first one to criticize the Bush administration’s current handling of North Korea policy, Obama is leaving off the key contextual half of this story that makes his specific criticism specious.

Obama is partially right, but misses the big picture that matters, particularly in regard to the point he was attempting to convey; North Korea started a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program after it secured the 1994 Agreed Framework from the Clinton administration, and was dealing with Pakistan’s proliferating AQ Khan even as former secretary of state Madeline Albright visited Pyongyang. Clinton was even considering a trip to North Korea.

Basically North Korea was pursing nuclear weapons at what was close to the height of diplomatic relations between the two countries, indicating (once again) that diplomacy and engagement is not a primary factor in Kim Jong-il’s nuclear calculus.

In other words, Obama is wrong about this.

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It’s been just over a year and the first birthday parties - regular and traditional (첫돌) - were last week!

I’ll be very busy and mostly without net access until mid-July.

Update: Probably it would have been better to get these answers *before* announcing plans to delist North Korea and remove other trade barriers, as that is what the agreements actually called for:

North Korea did not answer U.S. suspicions of enriching uranium and proliferating technology when it released an inventory of its nuclear plans this week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on Saturday.
[…]
“Thus far we don’t have the answers we need on either,” Rice said…
[…]
“At end of this, let me just emphasize again, at the end of this we have to have the abandonment of all programs, weapons and materials,” Rice said.

Original post: In an almost entirely symbolic display – since the facility was dilapidated and probably past the point of safe use – North Korea blew-up the cooling tower of the disabled Yongbyon nuclear reactor on 26 June.

See video of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor cooling tower exploding.

This came after North Korea finally provided a 60-page declaration of nuclear programs to Chinese officials in Beijing, fifteen months after the original deadline of April 2007, and six months past the extended deadline of 30 December 2007.

With the declaration, however, North Korea provided far less that it agreed to. Per the February 2007 deal (DOC), North Korea was to provide, “a list of all its nuclear programs.” North Korea has plutonium-based nuclear weapons which are not declared, and it is an established fact that they had (or possibly have) a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, neither of which are included in the declaration. Also not listed are the numerous other known and suspected nuclear sites throughout North Korea.

The lack of these items make the declaration, in practical terms and per the original intent of disclosing them, worthless.

Incredibly, traces of HEU were found on the documents North Korea provided to help clear up the amounts of plutonium it has processed, even though they denied every having a functional HEU program. There is also a suspected nuclear link between North Korea and Syria, which violates a number of nuclear-related agreements North Korea is party to.

Considering the reasons behind requiring a nuclear declaration from Pyongyang, what was provided is utterly insufficient and accepting it represents a complete failure of the Bush administration and the Six-Party Talks process. The possibility that U.S. officials had a hand in drafting the incomplete declaration for North Korea is even more damning.

Throughout this process North Korea has made the U.S. – the State Department in particular – go back on what they said on numerous occasions. For example, the “broken window” theory on the importance of not missing deadlines, and on offering a clear picture of HEU activities.

Despite this and in response to the declaration and symbolic display, President Bush announced his intention to have North Korea removed from the list of terrorist sponsoring nations. This is being done even though North Korea’s nuclear program is not related to the numerous terrorist acts the nation has committed, several reportedly planned by the current leader, Kim Jong-il.

President Bush’s approach to North Korea over the past year and a half has caused rifts within his administration and with the Republican Party, yet have yielded only an incomplete and probably inaccurate declaration, not even half of what was agreed to. Yet Bush pays the ransom.

The reason the delisting is so important to North Korea is that it removed trade barriers (never mind that North Korea’s ideology of Juche calls for complete self-reliance and rejection of capitalism), which will dramatically improve chances of the Kim Jong-il regime of surviving longer. In North Korea this is accomplished by a combination of taking care of the regime elite (inclining senior military) with special perks (like food, electricity, cars, etc.) while at the same time keeping alive the very real threat of sending even perceived dissenters to concentration camps, where probably no fewer than 200,000 North Koreans now live (and die). Delisting means income for the regime, and money translated into more power for the regime.

Also see:
- Analysis from Don Kirk and Ralph Cossa on these developments.
- OFK for more on North Korea’s incomplete declaration.
- Japan Probe (via ROK Drop) for a video of Charles Jenkins speaking about North Korea being removed from the list of terrorist sponsoring nations.

The Chosun Shinbo (조선신보, also Romanized as Chosun Sinbo), a newspaper in Japan controlled by the North Korean organization Chosun Soren (a.k.a the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, 재일본 조선인 총련합회), has endorsed Barack Obama over John McCain in the upcoming U.S. presidential elections. This is not to be confused with American-style endorsements from newspapers as communications from the Chosun Soren and via the Chosun Shinbo are generally understood as the official position of the North Korean regime:

The newspaper expressed hope of better ties between North Korea and the United States under an Obama administration, saying that even if McCain won the election, he could not reverse U.S.-North Korea ties.

Pyongyang favors Obama because he has vowed to meet leaders of rogue states, such as the North Korean leader, without conditions if elected.
[…]
Obama has said that he may be willing to sit down face-to-face with leaders like North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il if that’s what it takes to resolve the continuing nuclear tension on the Korean peninsula.

McCain said last month that it is of vital interest to the United States to end nuclear weapons programs by countries like North Korea, calling Kim a “dictator.”

It’s quite understandable that North Korean leadership would prefer Obama over McCain, considering – from statement he has made, data on his website, and information from the CFR – he actually has a grasp of the issues in play over concerning North Korea and will not appease them. This is, ironically, an area where Obama would pretty much continue a Bush policy.

Hamas and North Korea know what they want.

The Tears of My Soul. Kim Hyun-hee. William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993.

This book is well worth reading primarily because it offers a glimpse into the training and operational procedures of North Korea’s intelligence services. I’m not sure if the descriptions of training are credible or not, but have not found information to the contrary. It also offers a view of life in North Korea a few years before the great famine of the mid-1990s, even if that of an elite, which serves to contrast the realities of life for those in Pyongyang today.

Kim Hyun-hee (김현희) and Kim Sung-il (김성일) were the two North Korean agents responsible for placing a bomb on Korean Air Flight 858 on 29 November 1987, killing all 115 on board. They were captured a few days later and both attempted suicide by biting down on capsules of cyanide gas concealed in cigarette filters. Kim Sung-il, 70, succeeded and died immediately, while Kim Hyun-hee, then 26, lost consciousness but recovered and was eventually interrogated in Seoul. The Tears of My Soul is her description of the bombing and the events in her life that led up to it.

Kim Hyun-hee was born in 1962 in the city of Kaesŏng, near the DMZ. Her father had an important position dealing with foreign affairs, and the family lived in Cuba for five years while Hyun-hee was a child. Even in Cuba her indoctrination wasn’t forgotten, and she notes that, “even among young children anti-American sentiment ran deep… my father spoke of the ‘imminent attack by the Yankee Imperialist’ … after that I was too frightened to even return to the beach [from which the U.S. could be seen on the horizon].”

Upon returning to North Korea, the family lived as regime elite in Pyongyang, and Kim was “enrolled in extracurricular activities with an ideological bent, and those were so intensive that we often did not come home until ten at night.” There are many examples of the indoctrination and activities of the Youth Corps.

During her last year of high school, Kim was accepted by the Kim Il-sung University Biology Department, where a “class was called a platoon, a department as company, the undergraduate group a battalion, and son on. The class leader was called lieutenant, and the Student Department head was caption.” However, she soon transferred to Pyongyang Foreign Language College and majored in Japanese language.

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